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Introduction 
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between competition, liquidity 
provision, and market structure. A common perception, widely entrenched in the 
economics literature, is that the price setting structure of a dealer market 
approximately reflects the ideals engulfed in standard competitive economic analysis. 
In principle, the pervasive and (quasi) free movement of registered market makers, 
who underscore the liquidity provision and price discovery process, are necessary 
conditions that form the primary basis of this association.2 The advent of recent high 
frequency data from dealer market equity structures, however, has provided market 
practitioners with a rare opportunity to further understand the dynamics of dealer 
market structures. 
Recent literature on the dynamics of dealer market structures reveals that the 
attainment of a competitive outcome is both infeasible and potentially less than 
optimal in terms of its overall effect on market welfare (Schultz (2000), Ellis, 
Michaely and O’Hara (2002)). The inability to reconcile differences between the 
theoretical literature and these recent findings provides the motivation for this 
research. This study examines the mechanics of competition in a dealer market setting 
as a means of addressing whether competitive price formation is achievable in modern 
financial markets. 
The widely publicised and cited findings of Christie, Harris and Schultz 
(1994) and Christie and Schultz (1994) provide formative evidence of an apparent 
deviation from the underlying principles of competitive economic theory. In an 
examination of the NASDAQ market structure, these studies introduce evidence of 
non-competitive pricing among market makers contrary to previous suggestions that 
the NASDAQ market operates as a competitive market. The authors conclude that the 
divergence from competitive pricing is most likely the result of tacit collusion among 
dealers. These findings are additionally attested to by Barclay (1997) and 
Bessembinder (1998), who suggest that the larger than average spreads observed on 
NASDAQ cannot be explained by stock-specific characteristics, but rather by the 
more plausible argument of collusive behaviour. 
Despite evidence of a pronounced deviation from competitive dealer pricing, a 
number of authors have vehemently disputed these claims. Both Wahal (1997) and 
Klock and McCormick (1999), examine the contention that the NASDAQ market 
operates as a competitive structure and present resolute evidence to contradict 
previously asserted claims. The authors document a pervasive movement in market 
makers and show that the net incremental effect of market maker entry is positively 
associated with improvements in market quality. This evidence is therefore, consistent 
with the competitive model of dealer pricing. 
While there is confusion in the literature as to whether the NASDAQ market 
represents a competitive dealership, previous literature is also at odds to explain the 
possible sources of deviation from competitive pricing. For example, Huang and Stoll 
(1996) conclude that structural impediments – such as internalisation, preferencing of 
orders, and the presence of inter-dealer trading systems (which reduce incentives for 
brokers and dealers to act as advocates for investors seeking price improvement) – are 
                                                 
2 Stigler (1957) outlines a number of additional conditions relating to the pursuit of a competitive 
outcome, including: that participants must operate independently of each other (not collusively); that 
the economics units must posses tolerable knowledge of market opportunities; and that they must be 
free to act on this knowledge. 
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primary contributors.3 Shultz (2000) further argues that since dealers are not equal in 
terms of size, industry and geographical specialisation, potential deviations from 
atomistic pricing are more than likely in dealership structures. This point is echoed by 
Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2002), who show that despite minimal restrictions to the 
entry and exit of market makers, certain market makers are able to yield greater 
market power which is likely to result in a divergence from competitive price setting. 
The conflicting findings in the literature, narrowly based on the NASDAQ 
market structure, shape the direction of this study. We also address issues including 
whether or not free market maker entry is conducive to competitive price formation, 
and if dealership structures more closely reflect specialist-like structures than models 
of standard competitive economic analysis. 
In particular, this study empirically analyses the issue of market maker 
competition, specifically addressing three main issues in order to promote a better 
understanding of the effect of market maker dynamics. The issues initially centre on 
determining which factors are associated with maker entry and exit. Following this 
initial examination, the impact of dealer competition and marginal market maker entry 
(exit) impact is analysed with respect to quoted bid-ask spreads. Lastly, the types of 
affirmative market obligations, which are nestled with market maker entry (exit), are 
examined with respect to their effect on trading costs. The ASX options market is the 
subject of this examination. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section 
discusses the institutional framework of the ASX options market. The third section 
describes the dataset and provides summary statistics of the sampled data. The fourth 
section outlines the research design, the fifth section presents the empirical results and 
discusses the primary findings. The sixth section presents several additional 
robustness tests and the final section provides a concluding summary. 
 
Institutional Detail 
The Australian Options Market (AOM) is a contemporary mixed market dealer 
structure. Like many international option exchanges, the AOM has undergone a 
significant transformation over time evolving from a floor-traded dealer market 
structure to a dealer structure superimposed on an electronic limit order book. The 
market is characterised by a competitive dealer price structure that operates with an 
open electronic limit order book. ASX options are traded on a screen-based system 
over a range of leading shares that are viewable to all market participants. These 
options are characterised by a standardised set of strike prices and expiry dates that 
occur on the Thursday before the last Friday of the settlement month.4 Trades are 
                                                 
3 Additionally, whether deviation from the competitive outcome adversely affects the social welfare of 
market participants is also a contestable issue. Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) investigate the 
effect of preferencing and internalisation on spreads and dealer profits. The authors show that 
preferenced trades pay higher spreads than unpreferenced order flow. While this finding is indicative of 
the costs that result from violations to competition the authors do however, suggest that preferencing 
overall does not impair market quality. Other opinions expressed on this issue are provided by: Kandel 
and Marx (1997), Chung, Chuwonganant, McCormick (2004). 
4 The effect of excessive product differentiation through a range of expiries and moneyness levels has 
the ability to foster market power. Requirements by the AOM for market makers to undertake 
obligations in identical combinations of moneyness and expiry are designed to prevent possible market 
failures. 
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executed on a price then time priority basis, and quotes represent firm orders. In the 
financial year ending 30 June 2007, nearly 23 million options contracts traded on the 
ASX market.5  
Market makers play a pivotal role in the AOM. Market makers are charged 
with maintaining a regular market presence by quoting maximum bid-ask spreads and 
a minimum depth on a range of option series and maturities. The obligations for 
market makers as at 8 February 2006, are tabulated in Table 1. These obligations are 
ascertained from the liquidity category that a security is designated to.6 This process 
demonstrably contributes to the price discovery process by ensuring that option quotes 
are informative, binding and continuous throughout the trading day.7 Although the 
exchange compensates market makers for providing liquidity, market makers are not 
granted any special trading privileges over other market participants.8  
 
     Table 1 
Security Categories and Maximum Spread Obligations for Market Makers 
 
                                          Category 1 Category 2 
Premium Range Maximum Spread Maximum Spread 
0 to 9.5 cents/pts  
10 to 19.5 cents/pts  
20 to 34.5 cents/pts  
35 to 60 cents/pts  
61 to 120 cents/pts  
121 to 180 cents/pts  
181 to 266 cents/pts  
> 266 cents/pts  
5 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
6 
7 
9 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
This table documents the maximum spread (the difference between the best bid and offer prices) that a dealer can quote when 
making a market for an option security. The size of the maximum spread depends on whether a stock belongs to Category 1 or 2. 
Category 1 securities represent the most actively traded option securities. As at 8 February 2006, there were 25 Category 1 option 
securities and 60 Category 2 securities. 
 
Market makers in the AOM can operate in one of three capacities: making a 
market on a continuous basis only; making a market in response to quote requests 
only; or making a market both on a continuous basis and in response to quote 
                                                 
5 This represents the equivalent of AUD 27 billion in turnover. 
6 The two categories are referred to as Category 1 and Category 2 in order of the most liquid group. 
7 Demsetz (1968) argues that the lack of ‘predictable immediacy of exchange in financial markets’ is a 
trading problem that can be mitigated by the regular presence of market makers (pg.30). 
8 This is distributed as a discount in trading fees. There is no public record of the monetary amounts 
paid to market makers for maintaining obligations. Additionally, there is no public record specifying 
which market makers have maintained these affirmative obligations. 
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requests.9 Table 2 reports that there are on average 3 market makers for each of the 
134 securities for which options were written on between 18 September 2000 and 29 
September 2006. A dissection of these results reveals a heavy skew of market makers 
towards the more liquid securities group. The average number of daily market makers 
in Category 1 stocks is 8.5 as compared to an average of 1.8 market makers for 
Category 2 stocks. Furthermore the results show that market makers most prominently 
select to provide liquidity on a continuous basis where there is an average of 1.957 
daily market makers per security. Additionally, there are an average of 0.749 market 
makers with quote obligations and 0.304 with both continuous and quote obligations 
for each security10. 
 
Table 2 
Market Maker Designated Obligations 
 
Obligation Type Average Median Std Dev. Max Min 
 
Panel A - Category 1 Stocks 
(n= 8,075)      
Continuous 5.81709 6 2.87108 15 0 
Quote  1.48173 1 0.9602 6 0 
Both (Continuous + Quote) 1.25845 1 1.13404 7 0 
      
Panel B - Category 2 Stocks 
(n= 38,437) 
 
 
  
 
Continuous 1.14658 1 1.89057 11 0 
Quote  0.59542 0 0.97853 5 0 
Both (Continuous + Quote) 0.10297 0 0.37205 7 0 
      
Panel B - ALL (n= 46,512)      
Continuous 1.957 1 2.74 15 0 
Quote  0.749 0 1.031 6 0 
Both (Continuous + Quote) 0.304 0 0.727 7 0 
      
Average 3.01 1 3.834 17 0 
The following table presents descriptive characteristics of the average number of market makers over 134 securities between 18 
September 2000 and 29 September 2006. Market makers in the Australian Equity Options market operate in one of three 
capacities: to make a market on a continuous basis only; to make a market in response to quote requests only; or to make a 
market both on a continuous basis and in response to quote requests. Summary statistics relating to the segmentation of their 
obligations are detailed below. 
 
However the presence of market makers is not the sole source of competition on the 
ASX Options market. Market makers may face direct competition for order flow from 
limit order traders. Despite this direct competition, however, market makers are the 
                                                 
9 A detailed outline of market maker obligations in the AOM is available from 
http://www.asx.com.au/investor/options/trading_information/market_makers.htm 
10 A difference in means test between obligations across the different categories of stocks reveals that 
these results are statistically significant. 
AABFJ  |  Volume 6, no. 5, 2012 
 28 
primary providers of liquidity, representing approximately 80-85 per cent of executed 
volume and a much greater percentage of overall quoting behaviour.11 
 
Data 
The Reuters intra-day data used in this study are provided by the Securities Institute 
Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA) and are captured in real time from the 
Australian Securities Exchange Integrated Trading System (ITS).12 The data extends 
from 18 September 2000 to 29 September 2006 for equity options contracts listed on 
corresponding ASX securities. Each record contains a date and time stamp to the 
nearest second as well as fields outlining the trade price, volume and prevailing 
quotes. Quoted spreads are calculated using the best bid and offer prices.13 Option 
trades are matched with prevailing and average underlying trade and quote data. 
The derivation of option volatilities and hedging parameters are solved 
numerically via the Black-Sholes model (1973) at each trade price.14 Estimates of 
delta are given by )( 1dN=∆  for call options and 1)( 1 −=∆ dN  for put options. 
Gamma risk is measured in the following way: 
tTS
dn
S
p
−
=
∂
∂
=Γ
σ
)( 1
2
2
 
where: p  is the price of a call (put) option; Γ represents the net change in delta over 
the dollar change in the underlying price. 
A series of market maker assignments from the Australian Clearing House 
(ACH) is used to determine individual market maker movements from specified 
classes of options.15 Table 3 reports a total of 2,845 market maker obligation changes 
over the sample period. Between Category 1 and Category 2 securities, a similar 
number of obligation changes are observed. However, while there are 27 securities in 
Category 1, there are 107 securities in Category 2 over the defined sample period. 
The event change category reported in Panel C of Table 3, reflects the number 
of independent market maker event changes. In this category, multiple market maker 
increases and decreases, pertaining to a particular security on a particular event date, 
are classified as a single event. Furthermore, where there is an opposing event – 
where the entry of a market maker corresponds with the exit of a market maker on the 
                                                 
11 The AOM is primarily made up of institutional investors and therefore direct competition from 
smaller limit order traders is limited. 
12 The ITS is a modified version of the CLICK system developed by OMX Technology. This data is 
cross-verified with data provided by ASX CORE in order to mitigate potential errors. 
13 Most recent studies that examine bid-ask spreads in the microstructure literature focus on the 
effective rather than the quoted spread (see Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994)). Effective spreads 
capture the actual cost of executing trades by calculating the deviation of the trade price from the true 
price. Trading on the ASX is carried out on an electronic platform where the effective spread is equal 
to the quoted spread since traders cannot trade inside the quotes. 
14 To mitigate potential errors in this approach, implied volatilities are also calculated as the average of 
option series at-the-money strike, one strike above, and one strike below. This is based on option series 
with more than 20 days to expiration, and is consistent with the methodology of De Fontnouvelle et al. 
(2003). This analysis also uses indicative volatility estimates provided by the Australian Clearing 
House (ACH) and finds quantitatively similar results across all three measures. 
15 The Exchange advises market participants of market maker movements in AOM securities. This 
treatment is in accordance with ASX Market Procedure 22.3. These reports are available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/investor/options/notices/ 
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same event date – the event is categorised as a no-change event. Under these criteria, 
Table 3 reports 1,631 independent market maker changes and 514 ‘no change’ 
events.16 
 
Table 3 
Frequency Distribution of Market Maker Changes 
 
 
Panel A – Category 1 Stock Options (n = 27 securities) 
 
 Change = 1 Change = -1 Change > 1 Change < - 1 No Change 
Continuous 390 357 41 16 - 
Quote 154 151 20 4 - 
Both  96 118 2 12 - 
      
 
Panel B – Category 2 Stock Options (n = 107 securities) 
      
Continuous 378 304 48 36 - 
Quote 266 255 25 20 - 
Both  43 98 2 9 - 
      
Panel C – Net Changes 
      
Net Change in 
Market Makers  
748 697 102 84 514 
      
This table documents the frequency distribution of market maker changes in relation to 134 equity option securities between 18 
September 2000 and 29 September 2006. Panels A and B contain descriptive statistics regarding the type of market maker entry 
and exit. Panel C tabulates the aggregate total of market maker changes across Category 1 and Category 2 securities. The Net 
Changes calculation in Panel C examines the net movement in market makers in particular securities. For a particular security on 
a particular event date, if a departing market maker is replaced by a new market maker, then it is classified as no change. 
 
A series of standard filters were applied to the data. All records with time 
stamps outside the range 10:00 to 16:20 (EST), and the opening and closing trades of 
the day, are excluded.17 Low Exercise Price Options (LEPOs), which are deep-in-the-
money options and more accurately depict futures style contracts, are also deleted 
from the sample. In accordance with Anand (2005), trades and quotes that are more 
than four standard deviations away from the average trade price, or bid or ask quotes, 
for the particular option series per trading day are also excluded. The selection criteria 
results in a sample size of 4,693,469 observations. 
 Table 4 reports cross-sectional summary statistics of 134 option classes over a 
seven year window. Consistent with the findings of Benston and Hagerman (1974) 
and Stoll (1978), among others, Table 4 documents that the number of market makers 
per security is positively related to trade volume, volatility and market capitalisation. 
It is additionally negatively related to the bid-ask spread.
                                                 
16 Instances where market makers simply change obligations (without leaving a security) are very rare. 
They are not factored into the main analysis which only considers actual market maker movements. 
17 Market makers are required to maintain their obligations between 10:20-13:00 and 14:00-16:00 per 
trading day. 
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Table 4 
Cross Sectional Summary Statistics 
 
Market 
Maker 
Quintile N 
Bid-Ask 
Spread PBAS Depth 
Daily 
Series 
Volume Volatility 
Market 
Capitalisation 
No. 
Market 
Makers 
MM-
Both 
MM-
Continuous 
MM-
Quote 
1 938,694 0.046 15.98% 46.84 100.00 26.65% $3,404,021,172 5.31 0.57 2.98 1.75 
2 938,694 0.036 12.58% 39.00 196.81 27.22% $8,873,482,919 8.99 1.21 6.33 1.45 
3 938,693 0.033 12.04% 46.46 254.73 25.73% $12,066,900,540 10.78 1.37 7.81 1.59 
4 938,694 0.031 10.44% 51.32 296.64 23.70% $14,214,111,733 12.34 1.87 8.78 1.68 
5 938,694 0.026 10.35% 42.33 407.74 24.18% $18,710,873,124 14.43 2.32 9.80 2.30 
Full 
Sample 4,693,469 0.034 12.28% 55.09 251.19 25.50% $11,453,877,767 10.37 1.47 7.14 1.76 
Summary statistics are reported for 134 securities between 18 September 2000 and 20 December 2006. The statistics are segmented in quintiles, where quintile 1 represents securities, on average, with the lowest 
number of market makers, and quintile 5, the highest. Bid-Ask Spread is the average prevailing bid-ask spread measured in cents. PBAS is the average prevailing percentage bid-ask spread. Depth is the average 
cumulative volume posted on the buy and sell sides of the limit order book prior to the execution of a trade. Daily Series Volume is measured in contracts (one contract equals 100 shares of the underlying stock). 
Volatility is the implied volatility and is computed using the Black Scholes formula at each trade price. Market Capitalisation is the average market capitalisation of the securities in the respective market maker 
quintiles. No. Market Makers is the average number of designated market makers per security. The former category is made up of MM-Both, MM-Continuous, MM-Quote which are categories denoting the number of 
market makers as per their obligations.
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Research Design 
The design of appropriately structured methodologies relies exclusively on hypotheses 
that predict that the pervasive movement of market makers to and from securities is 
related to a range of profit, risk and market concentration considerations. The 
selection of variables for this analysis is guided by a number of standard competitive 
economic tenets, theoretical models of microstructure and extant empirical findings. 
The former two categories are largely bounded by modelling restrictions, whilst to 
date empirical findings are largely confounded by a range of contravening market 
frictions symptomatic of anti-competitive behaviour. 
The contravening market frictions documented in previous empirical studies 
are largely averted in this study since the ASX forbids payment for order flow activity 
and trade internalisation procedures. Furthermore, strict compliance guidelines 
regarding market makers quote provision are enforced by the ASX. This study 
additionally differs from previous empirical studies since it considers not only the 
characteristics of the main market on which the security is traded, but also associated 
markets for which hedging characteristics are relevant. 
The selection of relevant variables is both guided by perceived and actual 
profit, risk and market concentration considerations. Specifically, this analysis 
considers stock-specific characteristics that are likely to have formed part of a dealer’s 
information set at the time of entry (exit). As a consequence, lagged variables that 
measure the spread, volume, volatility and the number of market makers of individual 
securities are included. Furthermore, assuming that a market maker’s profit and risk 
considerations largely depend on the liquidity of the underlying market, (consistent 
with the hypothesis of Cho and Engle (1999)), hedging variables are included in the 
analysis. 
Both the dependent and independent variables are computed as fixed time-
series means over two-week intervals.18 This leads to the following general 
specification: 
         )( 1,, −= titi XfE  
where: 
....,2,1
),,,,,,,( ,,,,,,,
ni
MMakersVolumeGammaDeltaIVOLUSpreadSpreadX ti,tititititititi
=
=
 
tiE ,  denotes the probability of dealer entry (exit) in stock i  in period t ; tiSpread ,  is 
the percentage quoted bid-ask spread19; tiUSpread ,  is the underlying bid-ask spread; 
tiIVOL ,  is the implied volatility of an asset; tiDelta ,  is the option delta; tiGamma ,  is 
                                                 
18 The two-week timeframe is selected to ensure that the necessary parameters influencing a market 
maker’s decision to enter and exit are captured. For robustness purposes, monthly fixed intervals are 
considered and the results are qualitatively similar. These results are available upon request. 
19 Percentage quoted bid-ask spreads are used in this analysis rather than absolute quoted bid-ask 
spreads since percentage spreads are better able to deal with price discreteness. Additionally, 
percentage spreads provide a more equivalent method of comparing trading costs across different 
series. 
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the option gamma; tiVolume ,  is the log of the average daily trading volume; 
ti,MMakers  is the number of market makers, and is used to measure market 
concentration.  
The model is estimated using both Poisson and logistic regressions. For these 
specifications, the dependent variable is set to equal one when entry (exit) is positive 
and zero otherwise. In both specifications, independent variables are lagged by a 
single period. To examine the possibility that market makers respond to different trade 
characteristics for particular classes of securities, separate regressions are estimated 
for Category 1 and 2 securities. 
To examine if a dealer market which allows pervasive market maker 
movement and price competition will approximately reflect a competitive 
equilibrium, the concentration ratio of the market is examined on a discrete yearly 
basis.20 A Herfindahl Index proxy measure is employed which examines the 
proportion of volume executed by active market makers. This measure is calculated as 
the sum of squares of the market share of each market making participant as indicated 
below: 
    ∑
=
=
N
n
tinti SHerfindahl
1
2
,,,  
where 2 ,, tinS  is the percentage of daily traded volume in security i  traded by market 
maker n . A Herfindahl index score will range from 
makersmarketofnumber
1
 to 1. 
This is the range between a perfectly competitive market and a single monopolistic 
market. 
To examine the association between market maker entry (exit) and the impact 
on quoted bid-ask spreads, both 30-day and 60-day event windows are constructed 
around the entry (exit) of single market maker event changes. All overlapping event 
windows which result from multiple dealer entry (exit), from the time of the 
originating event, are excluded so as not to confound empirical findings. Finally, to 
control for other determinants of the bid-ask spread, a pooled regression analysis is 
undertaken with the following specification: 
Dummy EventaDeltaaVolatilityaExpiry To TimeaMoneynessaionConcentrat Marketa
 SpreadUnderlyingaVolume esDaily SeriaTickaPrice OptionaaSpread
1098765
43
7i
1i
210
+++++
+++++= ∑
=
=
 
where: 
Spread is the bid-ask spread prevailing at each trade; Option Price is the option price; 
Tick are a set of dummy variables that indicate the maximum spread per price step, as 
specified in Table 1. For example, where the option price is less than 9.5 cents, the 
maximum allowable bid-ask spread is 5 basis points which rises to 6 basis points, 
where the option price increases to 19.5 cents. 
Daily Series Volume is the daily trade volume summed across option series; 
Underlying Spread is the mean daily quoted underlying spread; Market Concentration 
                                                 
20 The inclusion of a concentration index as an independent variable was first purported in the market 
microstructure literature by Tinic and West (1972). 
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is an index of the sum of the squares of the percentage market share of each market 
maker; Moneyness describes the intrinsic value of the option; Time To Expiry is the 
time to maturity of each trade; Volatility is the average implied standard deviation of 
trades across daily option series; Delta is the average hedge ratio of trades across 
daily option series; Event Dummy is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if the 
observation occurs after the entry (exit) of a market maker and zero otherwise. If an 
observed change in the bid-ask spread of an option security is related to the entry 
(exit) of a market maker, it is expected that the coefficient of the event dummy will be 
negative (positive) and significant.21 
The previous specification implicitly assumes that the type of market maker 
obligations associated with market maker entry (exit) is irrelevant. Recent literature 
on the examination of affirmation obligations, however, suggests that the nature of 
market maker obligations may in fact affect market welfare (see Bessembinder, Hao 
and Lemmon 2007). In their survey, Charitou and Panayides (2009) document a 
plethora of obligations that are adopted by international security exchanges for 
assigned market makers. 
Thus, to examine the effect of differing affirmative obligations associated with 
market maker entry (exit), separate regressions based on the type of obligation 
associated with market maker entry (exit) are performed. The following specification 
is described below: 
Dummy EventaDeltaaVolatilityaExpiry To TimeaMoneynessaionConcentrat Marketa
Spread UnderlyingaVolume Series DailyaTickaPrice OptionaaTypeObligation
i
i
1098765
43
7
1
210
+++++
+++++= ∑
=
=
 
where: 
Obligation Type represents one of three types of affirmative obligations: continuous, 
quote or mixed quote-continuous. The regressions are performed across security 
categories to examine whether particular obligations associated with market maker 
entry (exit) are affected by different trade characteristics. Excluded from this sample 
are events where multiple market maker movements are associated with differing 
market maker obligations. Results of the following specifications are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis described in the previous section. The 
results are based on both logistic and Poisson regression frameworks for which there 
are 6,600 entry and 6,501 exit combinations over a seven year sample period. The 
findings in Table 5 indicate that stock characteristics, based on executed trades, 
                                                 
21 An issue with empirical analyses characterised by large samples is a tendency to reject the null 
hypothesis at conventional significance levels, even when posterior odds favour the null hypothesis. 
This propensity is commonly referred to as Lindley’s paradox. In order to avoid Lindley’s paradox, the 
critical t values are adjusted for the large sample size according to the following formula: 
   )](1[*
12
kTTct TT −−=  
where t* is the new critical t value; T and k denote the sample size and the number of regressors,        
respectively, in the model. According to Bayesian inference, a parameter is significantly different from 
zero when t > t*. See Johnstone (2005) for the derivation and further discussion of this method. 
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significantly influence the market maker entry and exit decision. However, the 
direction and significance of these variables seemingly deviates, not only from the 
expectations outlined in the previous section, but also from prior theoretical and 
empirical analyses. 
 
Table 5 
Determinants of Market Maker Entry and Exit 
 
 Market Maker Entry  Market Maker Exit 
      
 
Logistic 
Regression 
Poisson 
Regression  
Logistic 
Regression 
Poisson 
Regression 
      
Intercept -6.167* -5.916*  -3.811* -3.789* 
 (0.602) (0.572)  (0.685) (0.646) 
Spread 3.468* 3.150*  5.174* 4.642* 
 (1.273) (1.200)  (1.435) (1.336) 
USpread 6.00 5.611  12.808 11.373 
 (7.428) (7.079)  (8.154) (7.644) 
IVOL 1.158** 1.021**  0.817 0.685 
 (0.505) (0.471)  (0.619) (0.577) 
Delta 2.387* 2.181*  -0.414 -0.353 
 (0.931) (0.885)  (1.103) (1.044) 
Gamma 0.242*** 0.217***  -0.1745 -0.152 
 (0.133) (0.125)  (0.151) (0.141) 
Volume 0.400* 0.363*  -0.330* -0.286* 
 (0.056) (0.053)  (0.063) (0.058) 
MMakers -0.057* -0.051*  0.340* 0.299* 
 (0.021) (0.020)  (0.025) (0.023) 
This table presents the results of the logistic and Poisson regressions used to model the determinants of market maker entry and 
exit. The logistic and Poisson regression models are based on fixed two-week time-series intervals. Independent variables are 
lagged by a single period. Spread is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread; USpread is the underlying bid-ask spread; IVOL is the 
implied volatility of the asset; Delta is the option delta; Gamma is the option gamma; Volume is the log of the average daily 
trading volume; MMakers is the number of market makers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. A single (double, triple) 
asterisk implies a 99% (95%, 90%) level of significance based on adjusted critical t-values. 
 
Firstly, the results show that higher quoted bid-ask spreads are positively 
associated with both market maker entry and exit. While this finding appears counter-
intuitive (since wider spreads are traditionally connoted with greater market maker 
income, which should lead to increased (decreased) market maker entry (exit)), it 
cannot be simply discounted as statistically erroneous. While market makers are 
attracted to the possibility of higher spreads, if higher spreads reflect higher market 
maker costs, then market makers may leave the market if they are bounded by 
exchange-mandated maximum spread rules.22 This is particularly pertinent for 
                                                 
22 The continuous spread rules may lead to an overall social welfare loss (transfer to informed traders) 
if market makers are forced to maintain two-sided quotes in an environment characterised by large 
information asymmetries. 
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Category 2 securities, which are characterised, on average, by higher levels of 
information asymmetry (Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996) and Weston (2000)).23 
To examine the rigidity of the conjecture from the previous paragraph, a 
comparison of determinants between Category 1 and 2 securities is required. If the 
reason that higher quoted spreads are correlated with market maker exit is due to 
higher adverse selection costs, which are exacerbated by exchange-mandated quoting 
obligations, then it is expected that this association will be significantly greater for 
Category 2 securities. According to the results in Table 6, quoted bid-ask spreads, for 
Category 2 securities, are on average, strongly associated with market maker exit. 
This relationship, for Category 1 securities, is only statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. The nature of these findings lends support to the conjecture that if 
market makers are forced to maintain two-sided markets in environments 
characterised by higher levels of information asymmetry, then this may lead to market 
maker exit which may affect overall competition. 
In relation to market maker entry, the results in Table 5 emphasise that higher 
levels of volatility, option delta costs and levels of trading activity are positively 
associated with market maker entry. The positive coefficient pertaining to the level of 
trading activity is largely intuitive and consistent with competitive expectations. 
Similarly, with implied volatility and option delta variables, the positive and 
significant coefficients associated suggest that they are important determinants of 
market maker entry. This latter result, however, contradicts competitive expectations 
as well as extant empirical evidence (Wahal 1997). 
This previous evidence argues that an increase in volatility will increase the 
risk of carrying inventory and as such deter market maker entry. While this finding is 
suited to equities-based research, the nature of this finding may be of limited 
applicability to the options market, since in a more volatile pricing environment, 
hedging and other risk management techniques become more relevant and profitable 
for market makers.24 Thus the nature of this finding is likely to vary from previous 
microstructure results. Results in Table 6 suggest only limited support for this 
hypothesis. On average, the coefficient associated with volatility is positive and 
significant for Category 2 securities, yet insignificant for Category 1 securities. 
Finally, the results in Tables 5 and 6 also indicate that for both Category 1 and 2 
securities, stocks with fewer dealers have a higher probability of market maker entry. 
The decision of a market maker to leave a particular security is also analysed 
with respect to a range of stock and option characteristics. Table 5 indicates that the 
decision of a market maker to exit a security is significantly associated with the bid-
ask spread, trading volume, and number of existing market makers. Table 6 provides 
corroborative evidence of this pattern across Category 1 and 2 securities.25 Overall, 
the decision of a market maker to enter (exit) from the quote provision process is 
guided by rational and competitive, profit, risk and market concentration 
characteristics as predicted in the previous section. 
                                                 
23 This argument supposes that market makers may not always be able to hedge the risk associated with 
increased levels of information asymmetry. This type of risk is inherently greater for smaller and less 
liquid securities that dominate the sample of securities examined. 
24 In an environment characterised by higher volatility, hedging and other risk management techniques 
become more relevant and importantly can be profitable if strategies have been designed with a long 
gamma and kappa or vega risk stance. 
25 Table 6 additionally finds weak evidence of a relationship between higher levels of implied volatility 
and market maker withdrawal from Category 2 securities. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Market Maker Entry and Exit for Category 1 and 2 Securities 
 
 Market Maker Entry  Market Maker Exit 
 Category 1 Category 2  Category 1 Category 2 
      
Intercept -4.409* -6.440*  -3.359* -4.277* 
 (1.003) (0.779)  (1.109) (0.896) 
Spread 2.227 3.351*  5.444*** 5.447* 
 (2.465) (1.556)  (2.979) (1.786) 
USpread 5.615 8.882  24.000*** 6.342 
 (12.16) (9.266)  (13.452) (10.600) 
IVOL -0.186 2.333*  -0171 1.703*** 
 (0.744) (0.692)  (0.854) (0.906) 
Delta 1.597 2.630**  -1.511 0.022 
 (1.547) (1.191)  (1.764) (1.442) 
Gamma 0.231 0.059  0.017 -0.518** 
 (0.206) (0.181)  (0.221) (0.220) 
Volume 0.361* 0.335*  -0.289* -0.347* 
 (0.085) (0.079)  (0.096) (0.088) 
MMakers -0.114* -0.077**  0.313* 0.415* 
 (0.030) (0.035)  (0.036) (0.043) 
This table presents results of a logistic regression analysis used to examine the determinants of market maker entry and exit for 
Category 1 and 2 securities. The logistic regression model is based on fixed two-week time-series intervals. Independent 
variables are lagged by a single period. Spread is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread; USpread is the underlying bid-ask 
spread; IVOL is the implied volatility of an asset; Delta is the option delta; Gamma is the option gamma; Volume is the log of the 
average daily trading volume; MMakers is the number of market makers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. A single 
(double, triple) asterisk implies a 99% (95%, 90%) level of significance based on adjusted critical t-values. 
 
Table 7 presents results of the analysis related to market concentration. According to 
the examination, which involves analysing the average Herfindahl concentration ratio 
of securities in Category 1 and 2 security groups, a wide disparity in the nature of 
competition exists between liquid and less liquid securities. The results show that 
Category 1 securities are less concentrated than Category 2 securities, with an average 
Herfindahl index score of 0.172 for Category 1 securities and 0.447 for Category 2 
securities. 
The average concentration ratio of a perfectly competitive market, in which (in 
theory), each market maker receives an equally distributed proportion of the order 
flow, is also reported. The reporting of this statistic provides a direct comparison of 
the degree of market concentration for ASX option securities. Relative to the average 
concentration ratio of a perfectly competitive market, the results documented enforce 
the view that low volume securities (Category 2) are more concentrated than high 
volume securities (Category 1). This result is consistent with Ellis, Michaely and 
O’Hara’s (2002) analysis of the NASDAQ market. 
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Table 7 
Herfindahl Index Ratios 
 
  Category 1 Category 2 
Year Herfindahl Index 
1 / number of 
market makers Herfindahl Index 
1 / number of 
market makers 
       
2000 0.16203 0.1275 0.36871 0.18574 
2001 0.14208 0.11575 0.41902 0.17947 
2002 0.15752 0.10692 0.42859 0.22663 
2003 0.17334 0.09804 0.45854 0.22407 
2004 0.17687 0.09615 0.49909 0.22341 
2005 0.18255 0.10132 0.48586 0.22248 
2006 0.21401 0.12018 0.47168 0.23811 
This table documents Herfindahl index scores for Category 1 and Category 2 securities across discrete 
time intervals. The Herfindahl index measure is calculated as the sum of squares of the market share of 
each dealer as indicated below: 
    ∑
=
=
N
n
tinti SHerfindahl
1
2
,,,
                 
where 
2
,, tinS  is the percentage of daily traded volume in security i traded by market maker n. 
1/ (number of market makers) is a comparative ratio of a situation where market makers equally share 
trade volume and thus is the benchmark for a competitive market. 
 
The results in this study, however, show that low liquidity securities yield a 
greater degree of market power despite relatively free market maker entry and the 
emphasis of price competition between market makers. Therefore, while free market 
maker entry is viewed as a central requisite of competitive price formation, a positive 
association in this analysis also encompasses the level of overall liquidity. 
Table 7 additionally highlights that the average Herfindahl index ratio is up-
trending for both Category 1 and Category 2 securities. This result indicates that the 
proportion of business taken by leading market makers has increased over time. 
Although this may stem from a range of factors, the most likely reason for this up-
trend is that incumbent market makers accrue a greater degree of market power and 
are therefore able to offer superior quotes. This market power may be the result of 
incumbent market marker experience which is exhibited in terms of superior market 
timing or greater industry specialisation.26 As such, new competitors may be limited 
in their ability to attract a similar degree of order flow.27 The veracity of this 
statement, however, warrants further research. 
                                                 
26 Schultz (2000) argues that the fact that not all dealers are created equal in terms of capitalisation and 
industry specialisation may lead to divergences from a competitive outcome. The ASX strictly forbids 
order preferencing or trade internalisation so that this disparity in market power is most likely due to 
the factors outlined above. 
27 The average Herfindahl index ratio may also increase if there is a decrease in the number of market 
makers. This reasoning, however, is seemingly implausible given the steady increase in market makers 
over time. 
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The previous set of results indicates that the market structure of AOM 
securities diverges between a competitive (Category 1) and less than competitive 
(Category 2) state. To examine whether the nature of this state has implications for the 
entry (exit) of market makers, an event-study regression analysis focusing on the 
impact on quoted bid-ask spreads, is performed on Category 1 and 2 securities. Pooled 
30-day and 60-day event estimates are presented in Table 8.  The explanatory power 
of the regression models ranges between 25.95 percent and 36.76 percent. The F-
statistics indicate that the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero can be rejected at the 0.01 level.28 The standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) method. 
The results show that market maker entry (exit), pertaining specifically to 
Category 1 securities, is on average associated with a significant decline (increase) in 
quoted bid-ask spreads. This result is robust for 30-day and 60-day event windows. 
The marginal economic impact associated with market entry (exit), is an average 
decline (increase) in quoted spreads of 3.02 percent (4.42 percent). In relation to 
Category 2 securities, results show that market maker entry (exit) has a statistically 
insignificant impact on quoted bid-ask spreads. While these results contradict findings 
pertaining to Category 1 securities, they are nevertheless consistent with expectations 
that greater market power in less-liquid securities adversely affects the competitive 
price formation process. 
The results in Table 7 regarding Category 2 securities suggests that if market 
makers enjoy disparate market power, then the ability of new market makers to 
compete for order flow may be significantly compromised. On no condition, however, 
does this finding suggest that by improving the degree of competitiveness then trading 
costs will decrease. The results of this conjecture are tested and additionally presented 
in Table 8. According to these results, a significant (insignificant) association between 
the degree of market concentration and quoted bid-ask spreads is documented for 
Category 1 (2) securities. The implication of this finding for Category 1 securities is 
that bid-ask spreads are wider (narrower) under more (less) concentrated market 
structures. However, for Category 2 securities, irrespective of the level of market 
concentration, the impact on bid-ask spreads is insignificant. 
The findings in Table 8 inter alia, assume that obligations attached with 
market maker entry (exit) have a negligible impact on the price formation process. To 
examine this proposition further, three separate regressions are performed, based on a 
selection of obligations associated with market maker entry (exit). Table 9 presents 
the results of these regressions based on a 30-day event sample for Category 1 and 2 
securities.
 
Focusing on affirmative market maker obligations that are dually associated 
with market maker entry and exit, the results in Table 9 indicate that in Category 1 
                                                 
28 Conditional Index (CI) values furthermore indicate that multicollinearity is not a major issue in the 
regression model framework. 
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Table 8 
Market Maker Entry (Exit) and the Bid-Ask Spread 
 
 Market Maker Entry  Market Maker Exit 
 30 Day 60 Day  30 Day 60 Day 
 Category 1 Category 2 Category 1 Category 2  Category 1 Category 2 Category 1 Category 2 
Intercept 0.138* 0.299* 0.142* 0.287*  0.092* 0.128* 0.097* 0.145* 
Option Price 0.018* 0.005* 0.019* 0.006*  0.015* 0.020* 0.011* 0.023* 
Tick Dummy (1) -0.044* -0.172* -0.040* -0.163*  -0.038* -0.058* -0.052* -0.070* 
Tick Dummy (2) -0.040* -0.163* -0.035* -0.152*  -0.034* -0.051* -0.047* -0.061* 
Tick Dummy (3) -0.036* -0.154* -0.032* -0.143*  -0.032* -0.045* -0.042* -0.057* 
Tick Dummy (4) -0.032* -0.139* -0.027* -0.128*  -0.028* 0.039* -0.039* -0.051* 
Tick Dummy (5) -0.024* -0.114* -0.018* -0.106*  -0.021* -0.026* -0.030* -0.039* 
Tick Dummy (6) -0.011* -0.078* -0.006* -0.068*  -0.009* -0.009* -0.017* -0.021* 
Tick Dummy (7) -0.003* -0.046* 0.003* -0.026*  -0.002* -0.002* -0.008* -0.009 
Daily Series Volume (‘000) -0.003* 2.06* -0.005* 0.003**  -0.003* 1.04* -0.003* 0.001 
Underlying Spread 0.268* 0.423* 0.283* 0.414*  0.311* 0.470* 0.294* 0.537* 
Market Concentration 0.004* 0.001 0.008* 0.003  0.015* 0.001 0.007* -0.002 
Moneyness -0.106* -0.127* -0.122* -0.140*  -0.064* -0.072* -0.055* -0.080* 
Time to Expiry 0.022* 0.005* 0.024* -0.002  0.019* 0.012* 0.021* 0.009* 
Volatility 0.014* 0.042* 0.017* 0.050*  0.012* 0.018* 0.015* 0.12* 
Delta 0.022* -0.020* 0.037* 0.006  0.016* 9.35* 0.020* 0.007 
Event Dummy  -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* 3.27*  0.001* 3.72* 0.001* 0.001 
  
        
F-Value 12292.6 2166.82 11245.5 2783.03  8471.44 1165.99 10229.9 1664.36 
Adj. R-squared 0.3378 0.3676 0.3116 0.3289  0.2595 0.2855 0.2605 0.2832 
Critical t-value          
-1% 4.695 4.492 4.699 4.539  4.696 4.465 4.715 4.506 
-5% 4.330 4.108 4.334 4.160  4.331 4.078 4.351 4.123 
-10% 4.179 3.949 4.183 4.002  4.180 3.918 4.201 3.965 
This table presents estimates from regressing quoted bid-ask spreads, of Category 1 and 2 option securities, on independent market maker entry (exit) event changes between 18 September 2000 and 20 December 2006. 
The estimates are based on 30 and 60-day event windows and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) method. Independent control variables include Option Price, Daily Series Volume, Underlying 
Spread, Market Concentration, Moneyness, Time to Expiry, Volatility and Delta. Underlying Spread is the mean daily quoted underlying spread; Market Concentration is the sum of squares of the percentage market 
share of each market maker; Monyeness describes the intrinsic value of the option; Time to Expiry is the time to maturity of each trade; Volatility is the average implied standard deviation of trades across daily option 
series; Delta is the average hedge ratio of trades across daily option series. Event Dummy is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if the observation occurs after the entry (exit) of a market maker and zero 
otherwise.A single (double, triple) asterisk implies a 99% (95%, 90%) level of significance based on adjusted critical t-values. 
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Table 9 
Affirmative Obligations associated with Market Maker Entry (Exit) and the Bid-Ask Spread 
  Market Maker Entry  Market Maker Exit 
  Category 1 Category 2  Category 1 Category 2 
  Both Quote Continuous Both Quote Continuous  Both Quote Continuous Both Quote Continuous 
               
Intercept  0.091* 0.167* 0.142* 0.010 0.368* 0.248*  
0.070* 0.095* 0.190* -0.066* 0.203* 0.082* 
Option Price  0.013* 0.021* 0.016* 0.016* 0.023* 0.012*  
0.026* 0.014* 0.017* 0.023* 0.006* 0.034* 
Tick Dummy (1)  -0.019* -0.040* -0.055* -0.015 -0.195* -0.147*  
-0.006* -0.038* -0.072* -0.069* -0.116* -0.025* 
Tick Dummy (2)  -0.018* -0.035* -0.050* -0.015 -0.182* -0.137*  
-0.004* -0.034* -0.066* -0.074* -0.104* -0.021* 
Tick Dummy (3)  -0.016* -0.032* -0.046* -0.013 -0.170* -0.130*  
-0.003* -0.031* -0.060* -0.077* -0.096* -0.017* 
Tick Dummy (4)  -0.013* -0.028* -0.040* -0.016 -0.151* -0.119*  
-0.003* -0.028* -0.053* -0.084* -0.085* -0.014** 
Tick Dummy (5)  -0.005* -0.020* -0.031* -0.026 -0.124* -0.100*  
0.004 -0.022* -0.039* -0.096* -0.061* -0.009*** 
Tick Dummy (6)  0.009* -0.003** -0.021* 0.004 -0.090* -0.067*  
0.013 -0.011* -0.022* -0.085* -0.041* 0.002 
Tick Dummy (7)  0.019* 0.001 -0.009* -0.004 -0.055* -0.039*  
0.017 -0.005* -0.003* -0.054* -0.028* 0.010 
Daily Series Volume (‘000)  -0.002* -0.006* -0.002* -0.005* -0.005* 4.62*  
-0.001* -0.003* 0.003* 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
Underlying Spread  0.233* 0.240* 0.237* 0.125* 0.397* 0.395*  
0.198* 0.307* 0.229* 0.134 0.426* 0.473* 
Market Concentration  0.007* 0.009* 0.003** 0.003 -0.009* -0.002  
0.008* 0.012* 0.006* -0.002 0.002 -0.003** 
Moneyness  -0.063* -0.152* -0.094* -0.012 -0.163* -0.106*  
-0.064* -0.063* -0.132* -0.015 -0.078* -0.065* 
Time to Expiry  0.030* 0.014* 0.023* 0.014* 0.012* 4.65*  
0.033* 0.016* 0.014* 0.029* 0.007* 0.014* 
Volatility  0.020* 0.028* 0.010* 0.012* 0.051* 0.038*  
0.023* 0.013* 0.050* 0.024* 0.038* 0.020* 
Delta  0.002 0.040* 0.017* 2.87* 0.045* -0.002  
0.022* 0.008* 0.003 0.027* -0.038 0.014* 
Event Dummy  -0.001* -0.002* 1.49* 4.58* 4.45* -0.001  
8.05*** 0.002* 3.20* 0.001 -7.34* 0.001 
This table shows estimates from regressing quoted bid-ask spreads,of Category 1 and 2 option securities on independent market maker entry (exit) event changes associated with three types of affirmative obligations. 
These obligations include Continuous, Quote and Both (mixed continuous/quoted) based on rules between 18 September 2000 and 20 December 2006. The estimates are based on a 30-day event window and are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) method. Independent control variables include Option Price, Daily Series Volume, Underlying Spread, Market Concentration, Moneyness, Time to Expiry, 
Volatility and Delta. Event Dummy is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if the observation occurs after the entry (exit) of a market maker and zero otherwise. A single (double, triple) asterisk implies a 99% 
(95%, 90%) level of significance based on adjusted critical t-values.
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securities, both quote and mixed quote-continuous based obligations are 
significantly associated with narrower bid-ask spreads. This finding, however, does 
not extend to continuous-based obligations attached to market maker entry and exit. 
Regarding Category 2 securities, results indicate that the extent of obligations 
associated with market maker entry and exit are insignificant. 
The implications of these findings are significant since they suggest that the 
type of obligation associated with market maker entry (exit) affects quoted spreads. 
While these findings do not necessarily suggest that quoted and mixed-based 
obligations dominate continuous-based obligations, they indicate that the marginal 
benefit of quote and mixed-based obligations is significant for quoted bid-ask spreads 
of Category 1 securities.29 
The results documented in Tables 8 and 9 additionally provide pertinent 
evidence regarding the determinants of spreads in options markets. Consistent with 
previous empirical findings (including Neal (1987) and Mayhew (2002)), price, 
volatility and time-to-expiry are significant determinants of option bid-ask spreads. 
Interestingly however, while volume is expected to vary inversely with quoted 
spreads, the significance of this relationship is attributable to securities in Category 1. 
A similar finding is also reported in terms of market concentration. In relation to the 
underlying spread and the option delta variables, which are designed to capture the 
costs of hedging on quoted spreads, the reported results are additionally inconclusive. 
Specifically, the results related to Category 1 securities provide evidence that higher 
hedging costs increase option spreads concurring with the “derivative hedge theory” 
proposed by Cho and Engle (1999). There is however, only limited evidence to 
support this theory for Category 2 securities. 
 
Robustness Tests 
A number of additional robustness tests are performed in this section to validate 
findings documented in the previous section. For space considerations, these results 
are not reported but are available upon request from the authors. Firstly, to examine 
the robustness of trade characteristics, used to explain the market maker entry and exit 
decision, the sampling procedure is altered so that trade characteristics are defined 
over a monthly rather than fortnightly period. In addition to the sampling changes, a 
specification change is also imposed so that the decision between entry, exit and no 
change (neither entry nor exit) is analysed on an ordinal rather than binomial scale. 
This is consistent with the methodology of Wahal (1997). As such, an ordered 
regression analysis is used. This model encompasses a random utility framework 
                                                 
29 It cannot be said that quote and mixed-based obligations dominate continuous obligations since the 
type of entry (exit) may be dependent on the overall mix of prevailing obligations. Since continuous 
market makers dominate the existing pool of dealers, as documented in Table 2, the addition of an extra 
market maker with continuous obligations may be less relevant than a market maker with quote-based 
obligations. 
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which assumes that the utility of an alternative decision is a function of a set of 
attributes plus a random variable. The structural model is described as follows: 
;,......,1  where' niuxy iii =+= β  
where a latent variable y*, ranging from -∞  to ∞ , is defined by an observed y 
according to the following underlying latent model: 
               Jmymy mimi   to1for  if
*
1 =<≤= − ττ  
where mτ  represents a range of cut-points. Accordingly, the ordered response model 
is categorised as follows: iy = -1 for a decrease in market makers relative to the 
previous period, iy  = 0 for no change in market makers relative to the previous 
period, and iy  = 1 for an increase in market makers relative to the previous period. 
Estimation is performed via maximum-likelihood procedures. On average, the results 
reveal that, based on stock characteristics from the previous month, increases in delta 
hedging costs and volume are associated with an increase in market maker entry 
across all option securities. Furthermore, securities with a lower number of market 
makers also have a higher probability of market entry. 
It is furthermore documented in the previous section that market maker entry 
(exit), for Category 1 securities leads to a significant marginal decline (increase) in 
quoted bid-ask spreads. To reduce the effects of intra-day patterns, an examination of 
this issue is undertaken by averaging all trades for a given security and trade series on 
a given day. Results indicate that consistent with findings in the previous section, 
market maker entry (exit) is on average negatively (positively) associated with quoted 
bid-ask spreads for Category 1 securities. The relationship is however, insignificant 
for Category 2 securities. This result is additionally robust in both 30-day and 60-day 
event samples. 
To address a methodological issue related to the exiguously non-normal 
(rightly skewed) distribution of quoted bid-ask spreads, a non-parametric generalised 
linear regression model (GLM) with a Poisson distribution is used to affirm the 
quantitative trends presented in the fifth section. To additionally ensure that the results 
are not driven by any market anomalies (and so that only the most active option series 
are considered), the sampling procedure is also altered so that both longer term and 
near-expiration options are excluded. Options that expire within the next 90 days, but 
not within the next 7 calendar days are included which is consistent with the 
procedure of De Fontnouvelle, Fishe & Harris (2003) who argue that trades in the 
near term are likely to be motivated to avoid delivering stock on in-the-money 
options. The GLM regression uses a Poisson distributional assumption which more 
robustly approximates the marginally right skewed distribution of the quoted spreads 
dependent variable. The direction and significance of the coefficient estimates from 
this regression procedure are qualitatively consistent with the primary findings in the 
previous section. 
 
Conclusion 
Standard economic theory proposes a direct association between market maker 
competition and financial market quality. The extent of the association between 
competition for order-flow and market quality is additionally recognised by market 
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regulators who seek to mitigate market frictions and impediments to competition as 
well as market participants who are concerned with the level of trading costs and price 
discovery. In light of scant empirical evidence regarding the dynamics of market 
making in financial dealer markets, this study is based on the ASX options dealer 
market and provides evidence of a positive link between endogenous market maker 
movement and the level of trading costs. Significant insight is also shed with respect 
to the vexed issue of what impact affirmative market maker obligations have on 
market welfare. 
The results derived in this paper argue that market maker entry (exit) in 
financial dealer markets depends on a broad range of profit, risk and market 
concentration characteristics. Specifically, these factors relate to trading 
characteristics of the main and underlying market. However, while pervasive market 
maker movement is commonly observed in financial dealer markets, recent empirical 
evidence suggests that this factor alone does not necessarily lead to competitive price 
formation. This paper examines a trading structure absent of market frictions and 
provides evidence that free market maker movement does not explicitly result in a 
competitive market structure. 
This study finds that the degree of market concentration additionally affects 
the marginal impact of market maker entry (exit). Results pertaining to the transaction 
cost analysis indicate that market maker entry (exit) leads to a significant reduction 
(increase) in quoted bid-ask spreads for Category 1 securities, but not Category 2 
securities. In addition to this evidence, results in this study also highlight that the 
degree of market concentration is not significantly associated with the level of trading 
costs for illiquid securities. The implication of this finding is pertinent to market 
regulators since market maker competition may not necessarily contribute to 
enhancing market quality for less liquid securities. 
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